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A Reexamination of
Glanzer v. Shepard: Surveyors on the
Tort-Contract Boundary
Victor P. Goldberg*
In international commodity transactions, intermediary certifiers of
quantity and quality play a crucial role. Sometimes they err, and
when they do, the aggrieved party can pursue remedies against the
counterparty or against the intermediary, either in contract or tort.
The remedy against the intermediary has depended, at least in part, on
whether the plaintiff was in privity. Even absent privity, the aggrieved
party could possibly recover in tort (or perhaps as a third-party
beneficiary). So held Cardozo in the leading New York case Glanzer
v. Shepard. Section I of this paper reviews the Glanzer litigation, with
special emphasis on how the court suppressed many of the significant
facts. Section II then turns to restitution by the principals. Section
III explores the courts' general hostility to intermediaries' attempts to
limit their liability by contract, and Section IV considers the judiciary's
sporadic efforts to place extra-contractual limits on intermediaries'
liability. Section V examines the surveyors' response.
INTRODUCTION
In international commodity transactions, intermediary certifiers of quantity
and quality play a crucial role. Sometimes they err. When they do so, the
aggrieved party can pursue remedies against the counterparty or against
Thomas Macioce Professor of Law and Co-director of the Center for Law and
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their assistance: John Bogel, George Chandler, Paul Hong, Jim Murtaugh, David
Matta, Charles Updike, and Michael D. Young.
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the intermediary, either in contract or tort. The Restatement of Restitution
provides for compensation by the counterparty.' The remedy against the
intermediary has depended, at least in part, on whether the plaintiff was in
privity. Even absent privity, the aggrieved party could possibly recover in
tort (or perhaps as a third-party beneficiary). So held Cardozo in the leading
New York case Glanzer v. Shepard.2 Cardozo was confronted with the claim
of a buyer of beans (Glanzer) against a public weigher (Shepard) who had
negligently weighed the beans, the buyer having paid for five percent more
beans than it received. Cardozo found for the plaintiff, despite the fact that the
weigher had been engaged by the seller.
Glanzer's prominence stems in large part from its juxtaposition with
another Cardozo opinion, Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co.3 In
Ultramares, Cardozo held that an accountant would not be liable to an
indeterminate class that might have relied upon the accountant's findings
even though they had no contract. He distinguished Ultramares from Glanzer
by noting that although Glanzer had had no contract with Shepard, his
reliance on Shepard was obvious. In Ultramares, however, there were
a potentially large number of people who might have made unfortunate
decisions in reliance upon the accountant's faulty work; the accountant
could not be expected to take the potential problems of this ill-defined class
into account when performing, and he therefore held the accountant not
liable for negligence.
Although Glanzer and Shepard had no contract, it would not have been
difficult for them to allocate the risk of negligent weighing explicitly, either
in their respective contracts with the seller or by contracting with each other.
The costs of liability for certifiers of quantity or quality are ultimately borne
by the parties. It is predictable that measurement errors will occur and buyers
and sellers must determine how much effort should go into reducing the
incidence of errors, given that error reduction has both costs and benefits.
Thus, buyers and sellers have an incentive to economize by assigning the
consequences for such errors to the party that can most efficiently bear them.
So it is a bit misleading to view Glanzer as a matter of tort. It is one piece
of a default rule for the contractual triad, the first piece being recovery from
the counterparty. Its bite depends on the damage measure and the ease with
which the parties can contract around the default rule. American courts,
I Restatement (First) of Restitution § 20 (buyer overpaid) (1937); § 39 (buyer
underpaid).
2 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
3 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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it turns out, have been rather liberal in allowing the principals to contract
around the default rule (although not so liberal as their British counterparts),
but less so for the intermediaries.
Public weighers are members of a broader category of surveyors who
provide independent certification of quantity, quality, cleanliness, readiness,
and so forth. In Glanzer, damages were easily measured as the product of the
contract price and the difference between the measured and "true" weight.
For other surveyors, the damage issue is more complicated. Suppose, for
example, that a cargo of oil satisfied the contractual standard of a sulfur
content less than 1.5%. If the certifier negligently found the content to be
1.52%, the buyer could reject the shipment as nonconforming and the seller
would have to resell either to this buyer or to a new one at a lower price. The
certifier could be held liable for the entire price difference or some lesser
amount. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts allows the court to limit the
magnitude of the certifier's liability in certain circumstances,4 although the
parameters of that default rule are ill-defined. Relying in part on Glanzer, the
Second Circuit appears to have rejected that limitation in International Ore
& Fertilizer Corp. v. SGS Control Services' (hereafter Interore), holding the
certifier liable for the seller's entire loss.
6
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I, I review the Glanzer
litigation, with special emphasis on how the court suppressed many of the
significant facts. In Section II, I then turn to the first piece of the default rule
- restitution by the principals. Parties appear to routinely contract around
the remedy, making the word of the intermediary "final and binding," and
those clauses are generally (but not always) upheld. In Section III, I explore
the courts' general hostility to intermediaries' attempts to limit their liability
by contract. In Section IV, I consider the judiciary's sporadic efforts to place
extra-contractual limits on intermediaries' liability. In Section V, I examine
the surveyors' response.
I. THE GLANZER PROCEEDINGS
The dispute arose over the sale of about one-hundred tons of Caballero
beans from Chile by an importer, Bech, Van Siclen & Co., to a New York
bean merchant, Glanzer Brothers. That agreement was not put in evidence,
4 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351 f (1981).
5 743 F. Supp. 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
6 See Interore and text below at infra notes 84-97.
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and there is some confusion as to when it was entered into - the Complaint
alleging February 18, 1918, 7 while Glanzer's uncontradicted testimony put
the contract date in June.8 The beans were shipped from Chile in May and
arrived in New York in late July. Bech then sent an engagement letter to Core
& Herbert (a weighing firm in which Shepard was a partner) directing them to
weigh the beans:
These beans have been sold to Glanzer Bros. ... and arrangements
have been made for them to take delivery first thing Tuesday morning,
July 23rd.
Kindly communicate with Glanzer Bros. on Monday afternoon, to see
if it will be in order for your weighers to be on the pier first thing
Tuesday morning to weigh these beans .... 9
Core & Herbert determined that the 905 bags weighed 228,380 pounds.
Since that was in excess of the amount contracted for, the parties agreed that
seventeen bags would remain with the seller. These bags were weighed, and
their weight was subtracted from the total, so on net, Glanzer received 888
bags, which, according to the Core & Herbert weight certificates, weighed
224,086 pounds. On the basis of the weight certificates, Glanzer paid the
contract price of 10.5 cents per pound to Bech, and the beans were then
stored in a bonded warehouse. Glanzer sold the beans over the next five
months, the last, and largest, transaction taking place at the end of January
1919. For each of these transactions, the beans were again weighed by Core
& Herbert; after this last weighing, it was clear to Glanzer that the weight
of the beans it had sold was about five percent less than the weight of the
(same) beans it had bought.
Glanzer then sued Shepard for the difference, $1,262.26. After a two-day
trial, Judge Peter Schmuck gave a directed verdict for the plaintiff. The
Supreme Court, Appellate Term, reversed unanimously, finding that the
defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff to weigh the beans accurately; if the
plaintiffs were to have any remedy, the Court held that it should be against
the seller, Bech. This opinion was then unanimously reversed at Appellate
Division, and Cardozo, writing for the Court of Appeals, affirmed.
7 Record at 5-6.
8 Id. at 23. The Bech-Glanzer contract was not included in the record, although the
invoice (dated August 13, 1918) was (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, at 95-96).
9 Plaintiff's Exhibit 10, at 105.
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Cardozo found that the weigher had a duty "imposed by law," so that it
was unnecessary to deal with the issue of privity.
We think the law imposes a duty toward buyer as well as seller in
the situation here disclosed. The plaintiffs' use of the certificates was
not an indirect or collateral consequence of the action of the weighers.
It was a consequence which, to the weighers' knowledge, was the
end and aim of the transaction. Bech, Van Siclen & Co. ordered,
but Glanzer Brothers were to use. The defendants held themselves
out to the public as skilled and careful in their calling. They knew
that the beans had been sold, and that on the faith of their certificate
payment would be made. They sent a copy to the plaintiffs for the very
purpose of inducing action. All this they admit. In such circumstances,
assumption of the task of weighing was the assumption of a duty
to weigh carefully for the benefit of all whose conduct was to be
governed. 0
The defendants, he held, "weighed and certified at the order of one with
the very end and aim of shaping the conduct of another. Diligence was
owing, not only to him who ordered, but to him also who relied.""l
No direct evidence of the weigher's negligence was introduced. If the
weights were off by five percent and if the defendant could not present
a plausible alternative explanation of the discrepancy, the court would
presume negligence. The plaintiffs introduced testimony from a federal
customs agent and two bean merchants suggesting that shrinkage could not
have been greater than one-half percent in a year.'2 Glanzer also testified (in
a somewhat disjointed way) that the original bill of lading - which was not in
evidence - was for about 12,000 less pounds than the weighing certificates. 3
10 Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922).
ii Id. at 242.
12 Record at 30-31, 34, 38.
13 Glanzer testified:
Mr. Shepard was sitting at his desk. I showed him all the papers. He carefully
looked at them. ... I said, "Here is a bill of lading which reads for itself; it shows
the shipper has never shipped so much goods at all; where did you get it from?
You have given us a weighing certificate nearly 12,000 pounds over; where did
you get the goods from? The bill of lading reads there was never shipped that
much."
Id. at 41-42.
Glanzer further testified that he had another conversation with another employee of
Core & Herbert:
He said, ... "We have weighed the goods and that settles it. We don't know
anything about it. For instance," he says, "the man was in a hurry to ship these
20021
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The defendant did propose three alternative explanations: (1) there was more
shrinkage in these beans than would generally have been the case because
green (not dried) beans had been shipped; (2) the bags were not in very good
shape and some beans were lost; and (3) the batch of beans weighed on
arrival in August was different from the batch weighed on resale in January.
The last argument was buttressed by the fact that the weight certificates in
August rightly identified the ship carrying the beans as the Panama, while the
January weight certificates erroneously identified the ship as the Totten Maru,
a Japanese ship that had almost certainly never been to Chile. The trial judge
apparently did not believe that these explanations deserved jury consideration
(and given the evasiveness of the defense witnesses, he was most likely right).
No evidence was offered on the amount that Bech paid the weighers, nor
did Cardozo comment on the absence of this evidence. This omission was
rather odd since only a few years later, in H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer
Water Co.,14 hewas quite willing to infer that the rates charged by the negligent
water company were so low that it could not have intended to bear the risk of
liability.
The normal remedy for the buyer in this case would have been restitution
from the seller. Indeed, the Restatement (First) of Restitution uses a variation
on Glanzer as an example of a case in which restitution is the proper remedy. 15
The record was not entirely clear regarding Glanzer's claim vis-d-vis Bech.
Glanzer did pay Bech; that much was certain.16 There was no evidence as
to whether Glanzer had attempted to recover the overpayment,"7 but one can
infer that Bech never disgorged. The defense, in its opening statement, said
that it would show that the sellers "were a large concern and were responsible,"
goods, and he probably gave him five or six or seven thousand pounds too
much," and I says, "For the lord's sake, is it possible that a shipper would ship
five or six thousand more pounds than he should; where is the steamship? They
would demand freight charges for it if they would, and they have showed a bill
of lading only for 101,000 kilos.
Id. at43.
14 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
15 Restatement (First) of Restitution § 39 illus. 4: "A agrees to deliver to B 10,000
bushels of wheat at sixty cents per bushel, the wheat to be measured by a third
person. By mistake of the third person B receives 11,000 bushels. A is entitled to
restitution of 1000 bushels or the value."
16 Mr. Hasselriis, of Bech, testified: "Q. Were you paid for those beans by Glanzer
Brothers? A. I should say so." Record at 64, Glanzer.
17 Defense counsel asked Mr. Haselriis, "Was any demand ever made on you for the
return of any of that money?" Plaintiff's objection to the question was sustained.
Transcript at 64.
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but Judge Schmuck upheld an objection to such testimony being admitted. 8
The defense did, however, raise the argument in its brief:
According to plaintiff's own story, through a mistake in fact, they
have overpaid [Bech] $1,262.31. Apparently [Bech] still holds this
money and the plaintiffs have never demanded the same back or sued
for its return. If the plaintiff's story is correct, the payment to [Bech]
was a plain payment in mistake of fact, and recoverable. Plaintiffs
have not shown why they have never demanded or sued for recovery
from [Bech] or that [Bech] was insolvent. In fact, defendants offered
to show [Bech] was solvent, but this was ruled out. 9
The apparent lack of an effort to pursue redress against Bech remains a
puzzle. It is possible that Bech was, indeed, insolvent. It also is conceivable
that an importer might be beyond the reach of American courts, although the
fact that a Bech executive testified for the defense casts doubt on that.20 It
also is possible that the Bech-Glanzer contract precluded Glanzer's recovery.
That contract might, for example, have stated that the weigher's weights were
"final and binding." As we shall see, many contracts do include such language
and courts have often enforced them despite the fact that the weigher had
erred. The unfortunate omission of this contract from the trial record prevents
us from ascertaining whether the buyer and seller had allocated the risk of
weigher error between themselves.
2'
If the default rule were that the weigher would be held liable for
negligence, then the weigher could either accept the rule and set a price for
its service that incorporates the implicit insurance of accuracy or it could
contract out of liability. It could, that is, if the law did not constrain the
weigher's freedom to do so. If public weighers were regulated entities, it
is possible that the price of their services would be fixed by law or that
their ability to alter contract terms would be restricted in some way. Indeed,
if one looks in standard legal references like Corpus Juris Secundum,
there is ample evidence that in some instances, parties identified as public
weighers were subjected to considerable public regulation, including fixed
18 Record at 16.
19 Defendant's Brief at 25.
20 In the initial Complaint, Bech is described as a foreign corporation. Record at 5.
21 According to the Complaint, the initial contract said "goods to be weighed by an
official weigher, and to be paid for in accordance with the weight sheets to be
furnished by said official weigher." Record at 6.
20021
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maximum prices." Public weighers like Core & Herbert (Shepard) were
almost certainly not subject to governmental regulation, but the trial court
was decidedly unhelpful on this matter. Thus, Shepard's lawyer asked of him:
By what right are you a weigher?
Do you have any license to do weighing?
From whom do you get your license?
Who are the proper authorities to license you?
23
The plaintiff's objection to all these questions was sustained. Shepard's
deposition testimony is a bit more helpful:
A. Our firm is known as City weighers.
Q. State how appointed.
A. Business has been handed down for a long time.
Q. Is there a license issued to you?
A. There is a general agreement amongst the merchants that a
disinterested party should do their weighing.
Q. There is no formal license issued to you, is there?
A. By the Exchange.
Q. By the Exchange you mean Coffee Exchange?
A. By the various Exchanges and their different rules.
24
in its Reply Brief, the defense asserted that the public weighers were in
no way regulated by any government:
At the outset let us correct a mistaken impression in reference to the
nature of the business carried on by the defendants. There is no such
thing in law as an official weigher. We have examined both federal
and local laws as well as city charter and can find nowhere any official
or public weigher. It is entirely a private enterprise. The defendants
do not claim otherwise.
If the plaintiffs had claimed that they were members of an exchange
licensing the defendants, and claimed the benefit of the exchange rules,
and had brought an action thereon, the case might be different, but no
22 Weights & Measures § 6, 94 C.J.S. 552-53; see also Weights and Measures §§ 5, 6,
13, 19, 20, 21, 22, 79 Am. Jur.2d at 58-69.
23 Record at 45-46.
24 Id. at 84-85.
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such claim was made, nor is there any proof [of] ... any rule making
the defendants liable.25
That language is not entirely unambiguous, but a plausible interpretation
is that if the beans in question had been coffee beans, the public weigher
would have been subject to the rules of the Coffee Exchange, a private
organization, with an elaborate set of rules governing transactions. However,
since Glanzer's beans were not traded on any exchange, the only rules
governing the parties and the public weighers was New York contract law.
Apparently, there was no inclination to infer commercial practice by looking
at the manner in which the formal Exchanges regulated the relationship
between weighers and merchants.
Because damages were reckoned by looking to the contract price, there
was almost no effort to introduce evidence on changing market conditions. If
there had been a substantial price decline, it would not be terribly surprising
to find Glanzer looking for some way to mitigate the losses arising from a
bad deal. The defense, in its attempt to show that the beans might have been
shipped green and therefore might have been subject to greater shrinkage,
attempted to elicit testimony that beans were in great demand in June, but
less so in July and August. However, the only testimony was that the demand
was high in June and remained high until the first of the year (a month
before Glanzer discovered the weighing error).26 This seems plausible since
the contract had been entered into while the war was still on and the bad news
was revealed two months after Armistice; one might reasonably expect that
the market price had collapsed in the interim. Surprisingly, the facts do not
bear this out. Prices did not budge following the war's end.27
To sum up, processing the facts through the legal system left a number
of large holes. We do not have the underlying contracts. We do not know
whether the seller would have been legally obligated to make restitution.
Nor do we know whether Shepard had attempted to contractually limit his
liability in any way. Indeed, we do not even know for certain whether
Shepard's behavior and responsibilities were delimited in any way by
25 Defendant's Reply Brief at 6.
26 Record at 35.
27 Prices for marrow choice, New York beans listed in Bradstreet's, fell only modestly
from June 1918 to the end of January 1919. Oddly, prices fell from January 1918
through June 1918 by about 14%; fell another 7% through September, and then
stabilized through January 1919. Prices did fall another 15% in the two months
following Glanzer's discovery of the error, but they then turned around, approaching
the January price by the end of 1919. Apparently, food shortages in Europe helped
put an upward pressure on food prices generally in the postwar period.
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regulations of the state or of any commodity exchange, although we can be
reasonably confident on this score. Cardozo's ambiguities are, in large part,
a manifestation of the raw materials with which he was provided.
II. RESISTING RESTITUTION
The Restatement of Restitution rule sounds simple enough. If, because the
weigher had erred, Glanzer ended up with less beans than it had bargained
for, then the seller should make him whole. Yet traders usually undo that
result. Their contracts make the surveyor's certificate final and binding. And
with good reason.
A typical clause for an international petroleum product contract reads:
The quantity and quality of the Oil shall be determined by an
independent inspector at the discharge port, such independent inspector
shall be appointed jointly and the cost of his services shall be shared
equally by the parties. All determinations as to quantity and quality
made in accordance with the provisions of this Section ... shall be
conclusive and binding upon both parties.2 8
Notice, in passing, that the inspector is hired jointly, so that the privity
question disappears. Neither buyer nor seller would be a third party like
Glanzer.
The virtues of final and binding clauses were nicely laid out by the
plaintiff in a suit against a surveyor in Vitol Trading S.A., Inc. v. SGS
Control Services, Inc.
Even when done erroneously, [the measurements] still were binding
and either party had the right to act thereon. If this were not so, the
Inspection clause in the contracts would be meaningless. Oil traders,
and others who deal in the sale of commodities, need quick, definitive,
prompt and binding results or else there would be chaos. Buyers would
28 Cities Serv. Co. v. Derby & Co., 654 F. Supp. 492, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). In a British
case, in which the contract included a final and binding clause, the court noted
that the litigant "was content with the ... term relating to the load port inspector's
certificate, ... which he regarded as virtually standard." Baytur SA v. Ceminex SA,
Q.B. (Transcript: Marten Walsh Cherer) (Dec. 1, 1988).
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shop around for results showing cargoes to be non-conforming and
sellers would do the converse.29
In upholding a similar clause involving a domestic corn shipment, Judge
Wisdom noted that
where an inspection by a third party is stipulated, it supersedes the
buyer's right to inspect. ... The obvious purpose of that inspection at
origin was to establish a certain, reliable, and objective standard at a
fixed place and time to give the transaction certainty. It would serve
little use to have this inspection, if the buyer were free to accept or
reject the shipment after its arrival on the basis of its own inspection
at destination.
30
"To allow a mere mistake or error in decision of an umpire to nullify his
decision," Wisdom concluded, "would make the chosen means of avoiding
litigation - breed litigation." 3' In the absence of fraud, bad faith, or such
gross mistake as amounts to fraud, the inspector's decision will be upheld.32
That qualification leaves a window for overcoming final and binding clauses.
American courts have proved more willing to exploit that opening than their
British counterparts. Thus, the British court accepted the surveyor's certificate
on quality (asphaltine content), despite the disappointed buyer's claim that the
surveyor had not actually measured the content but had simply asked another
oil company (which apparently had been in possession of the cargo prior to
the disputed transaction).33
That final and binding clause might not have survived in an American
court. A surveyor's certificate could be overridden if the error could support
an inference of "fraud, bad faith or gross error." In one of the few litigated
cases, this turned out to be a very low hurdle. In Cities Service Co. v. Derby &
29 Vitol Trading S.A., Inc. v. SGS Control Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1989).
Plaintiff's Brief at 36-37.
30 Bartlett & Co., Grain v. Merchants Co., 323 F2d 501, 506 (5th Cir. Miss. 1965).
31 Id. at 508.
32 Id. Bartlett is the rule in most American jurisdictions. See 7 A.L.R.3d 541 and cases
collected there.
33 Coastal (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd., [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 11. For
other British cases upholding final and binding clauses, see Toepfer v. Continental
Grain Co., [1974] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 11; Rolimpex Centrala Handlu Zagranicznego v.
Haji E. Dossa & Sons Ltd., [1971] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 380; Berger & Co. Inc. v Gill &
Duffus S.A., [1984] A.C. 382; Nidera Handelscompagnie S.V. v. Sociedad Iberica
at Molturacion S.A., Transcript, July 5, 1988, 1986 FO 668 (Q.B.).
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Co.,' Judge Kram's finding of bad faith was based both on her conclusion that
the inspector's testing methods did not comply with the industry standard"
and on the magnitude of the error. In an earlier decision, Amoco Oil Co. v. H.
Grunewald & Co.,a6 the court had upheld a final and binding clause, holding
that an error of 1.7% was not sufficient to conclude that there had been bad
faith or gross error. She rejected the defendant's argument that an error of
2.4% should likewise be insufficient.
However, defendant's argument ignores that in the Amoco case
the damages sought totaled $42,181.80, while here damages of
$374,225.26 are sought. The magnitude of the loss here clearly is
much greater than in Amoco. As a result, this Court finds it sufficient
to justify such an inference of fraud, bad faith or gross error.3 7
In a few other instances, courts and arbitration panels have followed Cities
Service in rejecting a final and binding clause.38 Nonetheless, American
courts in general have been kinder to these clauses than they have been to the
disclaimers of the intermediary certifiers. To these I now turn.
34 654 F. Supp. 492 (1987).
35 The contract included a lengthy clause describing in broad outline the types of tests
that should be performed. Judge Kram found that the surveyor had failed to meet
the standards and concluded that,
where a contract sets forth the standards or procedures to be followed by
an independent third party to whom the determination of quantity, quality
or value is entrusted, the failure of such independent third party to follow the
standards or procedures prescribed in the contract will invalidate any certification
or determination so made even if the contract makes such certification or
determination conclusive and binding.
Id. at 501.
36 592 F2d 745 (4th Cir. 1979).
37 654 F. Supp. at 503.
38 See the arbitration between Clarendon Marketing, Inc. & Toro Energy USA, Inc.
(June 8, 1990) (inspector allowed the tests to be performed by the buyer's employees
while it merely observed) (unpublished); In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. & Overseas United Tankers, Inc., No. 2364 (Feb. 23,
1987) (unpublished); Sociedade Portuguesa de Navios Tanques L.D.A. v. Amoco
Transp. Co., 1984 AMC 2848 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (the person sent to do the survey
was held to be unqualified); Tesoro Crude v. Coastal States Trading Co., SMA 2587
(1989) (mutual mistake).
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III. DISCLAIMERS BY INTERMEDIARIES
Even if surveyors do perform in a substandard manner, they could avoid legal
responsibility by including disclaimers or exculpatory clauses in their initial
contracts. At least they could do so if courts were willing to enforce such
clauses. There is hostility to the surveyor disclaiming liability for negligence
that does not carry over to the corresponding disclaimer by the seller. The
different legal treatment of final and binding clauses and surveyor's liability
limitations or disclaimers is intriguing. A final and binding clause is, after
all, a disclaimer of liability: X promises to deliver to Z goods of a certain
quantity and quality as certified by Y. If, in fact, X delivers less than was
certified by Y, it is not X's problem.
Courts will honor some disclaimers, but it is not something one should
be confident about.39 Since the validity of a disclaimer is questionable even
when it appears in the contract between the surveyor and its customer (even a
commercially sophisticated customer), the validity is even more problematic
in Glanzer-type situations. The aggrieved party had not, after all, agreed to
the liability limitation. The general suspicion of liability limitations coupled
with the lack of privity makes avoiding the Glanzer rule a tricky problem.
In Plata American Trading, Inc. v. Lancashire," the purchaser of tallow
paid for 501 tons as per the bill of lading, but received only 375 tons because
of fraud on the part of the seller. Payment was made "relying upon the weight
certificate." 4' The quantity was to be measured as the tallow flowed from shore
tanks to the ship. However, some of it was diverted back to the storage tanks
after measurement, never reaching the ship. The court did not mention any
suit against the seller, the perpetrator of the fraud, I suspect because the seller
was judgment proof. The purchaser attempted to recover from the ship, the
marine underwriter, and the cargo inspector. The action against the first two
failed. Against the third, it was successful. Citing Ultramares and Glanzer,
the court stated,
Marco diverted tallow from one of his tanks to another and it seems
to me that Martin [the cargo inspector] negligently - grossly so -
lent himself to the scheme. ... When Martin was retained by Marco
he was told that the shipment was for the account of Plata and his
39 See E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 429a (1990).
40 214 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1957).
41 Id. at 48. It is not clear whether there was a "final and binding" clause.
2002] 487
Theoretical Inquiries in Law
certificate recites that it was Plata that had delivered to it 501 tons.
Martin's liability seems to me to be plain.42
It is not clear from the opinion why the court labeled Martin's negligence
"gross" or whether that label mattered. In Glanzer, it was not necessary to
prove gross negligence, and it is unlikely that the court was attempting to
raise the standard of proof.43 From my perspective, the most interesting piece
of the opinion was the dog that did not bark. Nowhere did the court mention
the possibility that Martin, the inspector, had attempted in any way to disclaim
liability. The court continued to enforce Glanzer, and nearly four decades
later, there is no hint that there was any attempt to contract around the
Glanzer rule.
The silence could simply result from the court's ignoring the liability
limitation - that appears to be what happened in some petroleum product
disputes, as we shall see below. More likely, there was no disclaimer. This
is speculative, but there are some pretty good reasons for reaching this
conclusion. First, weighers at this time were typically small firms that would
not be plausible deep pockets. Second, the losses from a weigher's error
were not likely to result in significant dollar amounts. Disclaimers would
be more likely today when surveyors (at least some of them) have become
billion-dollar companies and when small errors could result in claims in
excess of $100,000. In fact, as we shall see, even where the surveyors
are deep pockets and their exposure significant, the contracts do not all
have disclaimers. But before getting to those,let us consider two classes
of contracts that feature disclaimers and the courts' general indifference to
them.
Consider first the treatment of the surveyors' close cousins, classification
societies. Ship classification societies provide a variety of services to owners
of ships. Hull and P&I insurers will refuse to insure a ship if it does not have
the appropriate certification from a classification society. Sales of vessels,
charter arrangements, and contracts with cargo owners are often contingent
upon the society certifying that the vessel meets a certain quality standard
(that it is "in class"). There are a handful of cases in which classification
societies have been sued for performing their service in a negligent or
unworkmanlike manner. If the classification society errs, a ship might sink,
resulting in huge damage claims. Although the courts have rejected their
42 Id. at 49.
43 Gross negligence was, however, one of the exceptions under Ultramares.
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contractual disclaimers, the classification societies have defeated claims
against them on other grounds.'
In Great American Insurance Co. v. Bureau Veritas,4 5 a ship sank with
the loss of the entire cargo and the lives of eleven crew members. The owner,
charterer, and their respective insurance companies settled claims against them
and then sought indemnification and subrogation from Bureau Veritas, the
ship's classification society. Although he found in favor of the classification
society, Judge Tyler ignored its disclaimer of liability asserting that it "is
overbroad and unenforceable as contrary to public policy."46 In another case
involving a claim against a classification society for a more modest loss,
the court denied the defense's motion for summary judgment because the
non-prominence of the clauses in the contract "raise a question of fact as to the
actual intention of the parties. Moreover, we are inclined, without the benefit
of trial testimony as to the parties' intention, to agree with Judge Tyler's
dictum."47 One wonders what sort of trial testimony would help resolve this
question.
Disclaimers did not survive in cases in which the surveyor's alleged
negligence resulted in a cargo being lost. In Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia
v. S.S. loannis Martinos,48 the surveyor certified that cargo was properly
stowed on board. In the course of the voyage, eighty-seven containers stored
on deck, with a value in excess of $8 million, were lost at sea, and the surveying
firm was among those sued for the loss. The magistrate refused to grant
summary judgment to the surveyor, despite the disclaimers that appeared
on the "Certificates of Readiness. ' 49 Exculpatory clauses would be honored
so long as they do not increase the likelihood that negligence will occur.
Concluding that it would in this context, the magistrate held the disclaimer
void as against public policy.50 In a similar case, Bosnor S.A. de C. V v.
44 For a discussion of the problematic enforceability of disclaimers by maritime
surveyors, see Claude L. Stuart, III & Evan T. Caffrey, Liability of Marine Surveyors,
Adjusters, and Claims Handlers, 22 Tul. Mar. L.J. 1, 23-27 (1997).
45. 338 F. Supp. 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
46 Id. at 1010 n.6.
47 Sundance Cruises v. Am. Bureau of Shipping, 799 F. Supp. 363, 378 (D.N.J. 1992).
48 1986 AMC 769 (E.D.N.C. 1984).
49 [The surveyor] makes no warranty of any kind, either express or implied,
including warranty of workmanlike service, respecting its work or services, and
is not an insurer of cargo or other property or of the ship ... and disclaims all
legal responsibility for any loss, damage, personal injury or death resulting from
any act, default, omission, negligence, error or breach of any said warranties.
Id at 787.
50 Id. at 788-89.
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Tug LA. Barrios,5 the marine surveyor was one of many defendants in a
comparative fault proceeding following the loss of a cargo worth over $1
million. The survey report included this standard clause:
The surveyor agrees to use best efforts in behalf of those for whom
this survey is made, however, this report is issued subject to the
conditions that it is understood and agreed that neither this office nor
any surveyor thereof will have any liability for any inaccuracy, errors
or omissions, whether due to negligence or otherwise, in excess of the
actual charge made for this survey, and that use of this report shall be
construed to be an acceptance of the foregoing.52
The court, however, could find no evidence that the plaintiffs had "agreed
to this limited liability clause. Clauses that purport to limit a party's legal
responsibility are strictly construed and to be given legal effect must clearly
express the intent of all parties whose liability is altered by the agreement."5 3
Limitations on liability are commonly used in petroleum transactions.
In Global Petroleum Corp. v. Torco Oil Co.,54 the court recognized that the
surveyor, Saybolt, had attempted to limit liability, but still denied Saybolt's
motion for partial summary judgment.
The basis for Saybolt's motion is straightforward. Saybolt, since at
least 1983, has published a booklet entitled "Price Schedules and
Terms, Conditions and Limitations of Services" (the "price booklet").
They claim that it has been their regular business practice since that
time to send copies of this booklet to all of its regular customers and
that it is customary for all independent testing laboratories to do so.
Further, Saybolt maintains that it is industry custom for there to be
51 796 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. Tex. 1986).
52 Id. at 781.
53 Id. For another example of a court holding an exculpatory clause unenforceable, see
Dillingham Tug & Barge Corp. v. Collier Carbon & Chem. Corp., 548 F Supp. 691
(N.D.Cal. 1981). The clause in question was in remarkably plain English:
The Salvage Association London believes that the surveyor appointed by them
is fully competent to carry out this survey but the resultant certificate will be
issued on the express condition that neither the Salvage Association London nor
the surveyor shall in any circumstances be responsible or liable to any person
for any act or omission, default or negligence of the surveyor in the conduct of
the survey or the contents of the certificate or for any situation or event which
may occur subsequent to the issue of the certificate.
It at 694.
54 1988 WL 82239 (D. Mass.).
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no formal written agreement between testing labs and their customers
and for those customers to rely on information in the price booklet.
In addition, Saybolt includes a notice in bold letters at the bottom of
each of its invoices directing the reader to "Refer to our price list for
terms, conditions and limitations of our services.
' 55
The terms, conditions, and limitations included the following:
(a) Neither E.W. SAYBOLT & CO., INC. nor any of its employees,
agents or sub-contractors shall be liable for any loss or damage
arising out of E.W. SAYBOLT & CO., INC.'s performance or non-
performance, whether by way of negligence or breach of contract,
or otherwise, in any amount greater than twice the amount billed
to the customer for the work leading to the claim of the customer.
Said remedy shall be the sole and exclusive remedy against E.W.
SAYBOLT & CO., INC. arising out of its work.
(c) E.W. SAYBOLT & CO., INC. reports are submitted in writing and
are for our customers only. Our customers are considered to be only
those entities being billed for our services. Acquisition of an E.W.
SAYBOLT & CO., INC. report by other than our customer does not
constitute a representation of E.W. SAYBOLT & CO., INC. as to the
accuracy of the contents thereof.
(d) In no event shall E.W. SAYBOLT & CO., INC., its employees,
agents or sub-contractors be responsible for consequential or special
damages of any kind or in any amount.56
Hence, Saybolt, and probably the other inspectors, had for some period
of time expressly limited their liability for Glanzer-type damages. These
terms and conditions were incorporated into the contract by the notice on
the invoices. Or at least they would be as long as the principals did not
have inconsistent language in their documents. In a battle of the forms, the
disclaimer would likely lose.
In support of its motion, Saybolt produced an affidavit from someone who
had worked in the petroleum testing industry for over thirty years, stating
that he has
personal knowledge that it is customary in the petroleum testing
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laboratory to refer to the independent testing laboratory's schedule
of services, prices, terms and conditions in determining the terms
and conditions between the independent testing laboratory and the
customer.
57
However, the plaintiff's vice-president filed an affidavit in which he claimed
that he has been involved in "hundreds of transactions" and has retained
the services of independent testing laboratories, including third party
defendant Saybolt on "hundreds of occasions"; that he knows of the
custom of the industry in retaining testing laboratories, and that it is
"not customary for a buyer and seller to refer to the testing laboratory's
schedule ... in determining the terms and conditions.
5 8
That apparently was enough to produce a triable issue of fact.
Despite the fact that Saybolt claimed to make its liability limitations known
to all customers, three cases concerning alleged negligence on Saybolt's part
were decided without reference to the disclaimers.59 In only one instance
did the court both mention the disclaimer and honor it.60 Saybolt's negligence
"did not rise to the level of gross negligence and certainly not to the level of
reckless, wanton, or indifferent misconduct which would negate its limitation
of liability. '61 Saybolt's limitation of liability as set forth in the standard terms
and conditions in its 1986 schedule of services and prices limited liability to
"Twice the amount billed to the customer leading to the claim of the customer."
Since the fee for tank inspection was $200, Saybolt's liability was limited to
$400.
The uneven treatment of the Saybolt liability limitation is partly due to the
general hostility to disclaimers. It also reflects the manner in which Saybolt,
and others, attempt to incorporate the limitations into their contracts. Did
57 Id.
58 1988 WL 143135.
59 In Marathon International Petroleum Supply Co. v. LT.L Shipping, S.A., 766 F.
Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), the court ruled that had Saybolt's negligence caused the
loss, it would have been liable, citing Glanzer and Plata. Saybolt avoided liability,
however, because its negligence did not cause the harm. In Coastal (Bermuda) Ltd.
v. E.W Saybolt & Co., 826 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. La. 1987), Saybolt avoided liability
by showing that it was not negligent. In Anschutz Petroleum Marketing Co. v. E. W
Saybolt & Co., No. 82 Civ. 4498-CSH (S.D.N.Y. 1985), Saybolt failed in an attempt
to bring in a third-party defendant to reduce its liability by indemnity or contribution.
The court took no position on whether Saybolt had, in fact, breached its obligation.
60 Conoco v. Tank Barge Interstate, 36 U.S.D.C. N.J. Civ. 87-2269 (1990).
61 Id. at 3.
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the principals agree to incorporate the clause from the price list? A court
could easily find that they had not. One anonymous industry source told
me that after receiving the price lists, some oil traders send back letters
rejecting the disclaimers. This suggests that rather than confronting the
matter directly, the parties have chosen instead to jockey for position in
the battle of the forms.62 While the principals are quite at ease with final
and binding clauses, there seems to be a lot more resistance to the surveyors'
disclaimers. I will explore some of the reasons for that in Section V. First,
however, I will examine the judicial treatment of damages in the absence of a
contractual limitation on liability.
IV. EXTRA.CONTRACTUAL LIMITS ON SURVEYOR LIABILITY
If Glanzer's beans were misweighed, the potential liability would be easily
ascertainable as the product of the contract price and the shortfall. Other
failures by the surveyor intermediaries can have much more significant
consequences. If a classification society messes up, people can die; ships
and cargoes can be lost. Less dramatic, but still substantial, losses can result
if the intermediary's failure enables the buyer to reject a cargo. A minor
error in measuring quality could result in a million-dollar loss for the seller.
If the surveyor's contract includes no liability limitation, or if the court
chooses to ignore one, there remains the question: What is the extent of the
surveyor's liability?
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts suggests that the surveyor's
liability might be limited if the losses are grossly disproportionate to the
price charged for the service.
There are unusual instances in which it appears from the
circumstances either that the parties assumed that one of them would
not bear the risk of a particular loss or that although there was no such
assumption, it would be unjust to put the risk on that party. One such
circumstance is an extreme disproportion between the loss and the
price charged by the party whose liability for that loss is in question.
The fact that the price is relatively small suggests that it was not
intended to cover the risk of such liability.6 3
62 See Victor P. Goldberg, The "Battle of the Forms": Fairness, Efficiency, and the
Best-Shot Rule, 76 Ore. L. Rev. 155 (1997).
63 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 351f.
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In demarcating the boundaries of tort liability under Glanzer, Cardozo
invoked disproportionate liability in distinguishing H.R. Moch Co. v.
Rensselaer Water Co.64 He did not address the interplay between liability
and insurance, a question that has surfaced in some of the more recent
litigation.
A. The Ship Classification Cases
While rejecting the contractual disclaimers, the courts have invariably
shielded the classification societies from liability, either by invoking the
disproportionate liability exception or suggesting that having the societies
serve as insurers was impractical. In Bureau Veritas, Judge Tyler held that
the defendant's acts were neither negligent nor unworkmanlike (no fault)
and that even if they had been at fault, the owner and charterer were fully
informed of the defects. (There was intervening fault, or alternatively, there
was no reliance.) The finding of no fault made it unnecessary to deal with
the general question of subjecting classification societies to liability for
substandard performance. Although the issue had not been briefed, Tyler
suggested that it would be unwise to hold the classification society liable,
noting that liability would convert the classification society into a de facto
insurer.
[T]his right of action would have the effect of making the classification
society an absolute insurer of any vessel it surveys and certifies. Not
only is this liability not commensurate with the amount of control that
a classification society has over a vessel; it is also not in accord with
the intent of the parties, the fees charged or the service performed.
Further, by making classification societies the effective insurers of
nearly all seagoing vessels, insurance companies such as those here
involved, might be putting themselves out of business, a result they
certainly did not contemplate by bringing this suit.
65
In Sundance Cruises Corp. v. The American Bureau of Shipping,66 the
Bureau issued a safety certificate for a vessel, such certificates being required
if a vessel is to obtain hull insurance and to operate in international trade.
Fifteen days after the certificate was issued, the ship sank. The owner sought
64 159 N.E. 896 (1928).
65 Id. at 1012.
66 799 F. Supp. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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compensatory damages of $64 million and punitive damages of $200 million.
The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
[T]he disparity between the $85,000 contract price paid and the more
than $64 million in damages claimed supported our conclusion that in
issuing the certificates defendant had no intention of guaranteeing the
vessel's seaworthiness or becoming the shipowner's insurer. ... [W]e
inferred that the fees defendant charged here are comparable to those
that any other of the classification societies nominated by the Bahamas
to issue statutory safety certificates on its behalf would have charged.
It thus appeared to us that accepted classification society practice with
respect to fees indicates that such societies do not assume the risk of
acting as insurer.67
Thus, as in Bureau Veritas, the court relied in part on an inference from the
magnitude of the fees to conclude that the classification society could not
have meant to act as an insurer.
We are left then with the odd picture of a court inferring the content
of a contract, while, at the same time, rejecting the explicit language (the
disclaimers) of the contract. What makes that rejection especially odd is that
the Sundance court emphatically rejected two of the primary grounds for
not enforcing exculpatory clauses. The plaintiff was a large, sophisticated
business entity with the capacity to negotiate terms for itself, and the ship
certification business itself is highly competitive. "[T]he Agreement into
which plaintiff ultimately entered could not be found to be the result of
anything but arms-length bargaining."' Granted that, what function could
be served by substituting the inference from the apparent inadequacy of an
$85,000 fee for explicit contract language?
The House of Lords came to the same result without invoking
disproportionate liability, relying instead on intuitions about the interaction
between liability and insurance in Marc Rich & Co. AG v. Bishop Rock
Marine Co. Ltd. (The Nicholas H).69 It would be wasteful, the Lords
suggested, for the society to act as an insurer. After the ship went down,
the cargo owners collected $500,000 from the ship owner, the statutory
maximum (a tonnage limitation) and then sued the classification society
for the balance of their claim, $5.7 million. Assuming for purposes of the
67 Id. at 376. The granting of summary judgment was justified on other grounds as
well, including a finding that under the applicable law (Bahamian), the defendant
was an agent of the state and therefore immune.
68 Id. at 383.
69 [1996] 1 A.C. 211.
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litigation that the society had been careless and that the consequences of
the lack of care had been foreseeable, the Lords held that the shipowners
had a non-delegable contractual duty and that it would not be "fair, just,
and reasonable" to impose through tort a duty of care upon the classification
society. The owner's contractual duty was circumscribed by an elaborate
set of legal rules (the Hague Rules on tonnage limitations70) that "create
an intricate blend of responsibilities and liabilities, rights and immunities,
limitations on the amount of damages recoverable, time bars, evidential
provisions, indemnities and liberties;" holding the defendant liable "would
add an identical or virtually identical duty owed by the classification society
to that owed by the shipowners, but without any of these balancing factors,
which are internationally recognised and accepted."7
Lord Steyn for the majority suggested that imposing liability might
have unfortunate effects on the classification society's incentives.72 He
further suggested that the costs of liability would ultimately be passed on to
shipowners, either in higher fees for classification services (to cover increased
insurance costs) or in indemnification arrangements, which, in effect, would
allow an end-run around the statutory limitations on recovery against the
owner.73 Allowing a claim of this sort would add considerable deadweight
costs to the process of settling claims between cargo and ship.
70 6 Benedict on Admiralty chs. I-V (7th ed. rev. 1996) (Chapter I: Carriage of Goods
by Sea Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Visby
Amendments, Feb. 23, 1968); the tonnage limitations are from section 503 of the
English Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, reenacted as section 185 of and Schedule
7 to the Merchant Shipping Act of 1995.
71 [1996] 1 A.C. at 238 (citing Marc Rich & Co. v. Bishop Rock Marine. Co. Ltd.,
[1994] 3 All E.R. 686, 1080).
72 [T]he question is whether ... classification societies ... would be able to carry
out their functions as efficiently if they become the ready alternative target of
cargo owners, who already have contractual claims against shipowners. ... In
my judgment there must be some apprehension that the classification societies
would adopt, to the detriment of their traditional role, a more defensive position.
[1996] 1 A.C. at 241.
If such a duty is recognised, there is a risk that classification societies might
be unwilling from time to time to survey the very vessels which most urgently
require independent examination. It will also divert men and resources from the
prime function of classification societies, namely to save life and ships at sea.
Id.
73 In a different context, product liability suits with indemnification against the owner
have allowed injured workers to collect damages from employers in excess of those
mandated in workers' compensation statutes.
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At present, the system of settling cargo claims against shipowners is
a relatively simple one. The claims are settled between the two sets of
insurers. If the claims are not settled, they are resolved in arbitration
or court proceedings. If a duty is held to exist in this case as between
the classification society and cargo owners, classification societies will
become potential defendants in many cases. An extra layer of insurance
will become involved. The settlement process will inevitably become
more complicated and expensive. Arbitration proceedings and court
proceedings will often involve an additional party. And often-similar
issues will have to be canvassed in separate proceedings since the
classification societies will not be bound by arbitration clauses in the
contracts of carriage.74
In dissent, Lord Lloyd of Berwick questioned the majority's arguments
regarding insurance. There was, he noted, no evidence on the costs of
insurance or on whether the costs would be passed on." Regarding the claim
that liability would entail a wasteful extra layer of insurance, he argued that
traditionally, courts have treated the availability of insurance as irrelevant.
Even if it were to be given some weight, in this particular case no evidence
had been introduced. He continued:
[T]he court should be wary of expressing any view on the insurance
position without any evidence on the point, and should not speculate as
to the effect, if any, of an extra layer of insurance on the cost of settling
claims. For what it may be worth, I would for my part doubt whether it
would make much difference. More generally, I suspect that a decision
in favour of the cargo owners would be welcomed by members of the
shipping community at large, who are increasingly concerned by the
proliferation of sub-standard classification societies.76
74 [1996] 1 A.C. at 241.
75 Id. at 222.
76 Id. at 229. In Carbotrade S.p.A. v. Bureau Veritas, 901 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.N.Y.
1995), the charterer obtained a default judgment against the owner of a sunken
vessel in an arbitration. The charterer could not recover from the owner or from the
owner's insurer (who claimed that the coverage was voided by the owner's violation
of manning requirements). The charterer's insurer paid a $1.25 million claim to
the owner of the cargo. Pursuant to their settlement agreement, the charterer, its
insurer, and the cargo owner were to divvy up any recovery they could get from
the classification society for an allegedly inadequate performance of its duties.
Applying British law, the court concluded that The Nicholas H was apposite, and it
granted summary judgment for the defense. It would also grant summary judgment
if federal maritime law applied. Concluding that the case was more like Ultramares
than Glanzer (with respect to the "ends and aim of the transaction"), the court held
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B. The Surveyor Cases
The disproportionate liability question arose in two cases involving SGS,
one of the major surveyors. In the first, Vitol Trading S.A., Inc. v. SGS
Control Services, Inc.,77 it was merely dictum, as the court decided the case
on other grounds. In the second, Interore, 8 the Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court's finding on the issue despite the fact that the issue had not even
been argued by the plaintiff.
Vitol sold naphtha to Sun Oil; SGS was jointly hired to test the contents
to assure that they met the specifications. The market value of the cargo
was about $11 million, and when SGS's tests showed that the cargo failed
to meet specifications, Sun rejected the cargo. It then purchased the same
cargo from Vitol at distress prices. Vitol sued SGS for its losses (around
$475,000), which consisted primarily of the price differential.
SGS, the court found, had breached its duty of workmanlike performance.
However, since the facts suggested that Vitol had tendered nonconforming
cargo, the breach did not cause the harm. Vitol's remedy was therefore
limited to return of its share of the fee SGS had received for performing
the particular test - $220. But what if SGS's failure had caused Vitol's
loss?7 9 In dicta, the court suggested that Vitol would not have been entitled
to recover for these special damages. Given the modest compensation, it
was not reasonable to infer that SGS had assumed this risk.
that since the survey was performed for the owner, no duty of care was owed by
the surveyor to either the charterer or the cargo. Even if it did owe such a duty,
there was no evidence that the plaintiffs had relied on the classification certificates.
The defendant had, in this instance, identified the defects, but had arguably not put
sufficient weight upon them when determining that the ship could safely make its
next voyage. On appeal, the court held that Greek law applied and that a trial on the
issue of negligence was required. At a bench trial, the court concluded that there was
no negligence, and that result was upheld on appeal. Carbotrade, S.p.A. v. Bureau
Veritas, 99 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1996); Carbotrade S.p.A. v. Bureau Veritas, 216
F.3d 1071 (2d Cir. N.Y. 2000) (unpublished opinion).
77 874 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. N.Y. 1989).
78 743 F Supp. 250 (1990).
79 The plaintiff's brief included a strong hint that there had been no disclaimers:
SGS argues that Vitol's loss was not foreseeable because SGS's inspection fee
was so low. There is no case law to the effect that the liability of a provider of
services is somewhat limited by the amount charged.... If SGS wanted to limit
liability it simply could have inserted such a provision in its rates and tariffs
so that a potential customer would have knowledge of any limitation before
deciding whether to utilize such services.
Plaintiff's Brief at 40.
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This enormous disparity between the fee SGS charged Vitol and the
damage liability SGS allegedly assumed is persuasive evidence that
assumption of that risk was not within SGS's contemplation at the
time it agreed to perform the testing .... If, as a rational economic
actor, SGS intended to assume that risk, plainly it would have charged
substantially more for its testing services. Or it might have turned
down Vitol's request altogether rather than risking so large a liability
for a pittance.8"
Ironically, the evidence of the disparity was not introduced at trial. In
papers filed after the decision, the plaintiff observed, "[T]here is no proof
as to what SGS charged because SGS did not submit any during the trial
as its charges and fees were not in issue at any time. The only part of the
record that contains any mention of the fees is in SGS' Answer.'' 8 The $220
fee was the charge for a single test, which had been performed negligently
(by a subcontractor); the charges for the entire SGS service were $13,556.36,
half of which was assessed to Vitol and half to Sun.82 That, arguably, is not a
pittance.
Petroleum shipments are large enough so that even fairly modest errors
in the measurement of quantity can translate into significant dollar amounts.
Nonetheless, as in Vitol, the surveyors' significant exposure comes from
cases where the error allows the buyer to reject delivery. That was also
the case in Interore. The underlying transaction was a $4 million contract
for the sale of fertilizer by Interore to buyers in New Zealand. Part of the
cargo was picked up in Sweden, and the remainder in Florida. The contract
required Interore to secure the services of a "hold inspector" to certify that
the ship's hold was clean prior to loading. SGS, which had provided such
a service to Interore hundreds of times in the past, agreed to do so for
$50 per hold, $150 in total.83 The inspection failed to detect some barley
80 Vitol, 874 F.2d at 81 (citations omitted). The court cited the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts section 351: "The fact that price [charged] is relatively small suggests that
it was not intended to cover the risk of such liability." Id. at 81. Judge Cardamone,
writing for the panel, also attempted to distinguish the case from Glanzer by arguing
that the public weigher had had more notice of the consequences of its error than had
SGS. In his concurrence, Judge Pratt disputed this, arguing that SGS's knowledge
of the Sun-Vitol contract put it squarely within the Glanzer exception. The third
member of the panel, Judge Feinberg, felt it unnecessary to choose sides.
81 Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing at 12.
82 Id.
83 SGS performed other services (supervising the loading, chemical analysis of the
fertilizer) for an additional $1,860. 743 F Supp. at 252.
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left over from a prior voyage. When the cargo arrived in New Zealand, it was
contaminated with barley, and the Ministry of Agriculture denied it entry. The
cargo was ultimately rejected and resold in Europe for less than the contract
price. While the contamination was the ostensible ground for rejection, the
buyer's refusal to accept the fertilizer was more likely based on the facts
that the market price for fertilizer had fallen considerably prior to delivery
and New Zealand's currency had been devalued. There was some testimony
from those in the trade that rejection of a contaminated cargo of fertilizer was
unprecedented, the normal remedy being a price adjustment;84 however, the
court did not find this significant.
The seller brought suit in the United States against SGS for its failure to
perform its inspection in a workmanlike manner. It did not sue the Swedish
inspector (another SGS company), even though the holds loaded in Sweden
also had been contaminated (perhaps because the Swedish inspector included
a liability limitation in its contract). The seller's suit against SGS was a
small piece of the litigation pie, with the primary litigation taking place
in New Zealand involving the buyer, seller, vessel, and cargo insurers.
85
The buyer, East Coast, ultimately paid $400,000 to Interore to settle the New
Zealand claim. However, the parties designated the settlement as pertaining
only to the Swedish portion of the cargo, thereby allowing Interore to pursue
its claim for the American damages against SGS.86
Unlike its Swedish counterpart, SGS did not attempt to disclaim liability.
The following legend, in capital letters, appeared at the bottom of its
Certificate of Readiness, a preprinted form: "All inspections are carried out
to the best of our knowledge and ability and our responsibility is limited
to the exercise of reasonable care."8 7 The court interpreted this to mean that
the service was to be performed in a workmanlike manner. The defense, in its
post-trial motions, did not attempt to deny that SGS would be responsible for
negligent performance; rather, it attempted to show that the performance was
reasonable, even though the outcome was unfortunate. "Plaintiff knew from
84 Defendant's Brief at 42-43.
85 Int'l Ore & Fertilizer Corp. v. East Coast Fertilizer Co. Ltd., [1986] 1 N.Z.L.R. 9,
13. In Glanzer, the lawsuit was filed by the buyer, who was not party to the weighing
contract; here, in the American case, the plaintiff was in privity. In fact, the fertilizer
contract was a cost and freight ("c&f') contract, so title should have passed when
the ship was loaded. The buyer should have borne the risk of contamination, and
SGS should have been defending against the buyer, making the case more directly
parallel to Glanzer.
86 Plaintiff's Brief at 34-35.
87 Int'l Ore & Fertilizer Corp. v. SGS Control Serv. Inc., 743 F. Supp. 250, 254 (1990).
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extensive prior experience what the inspections they requested would entail.
If they wished to alter the nature or scope of the duties to be performed under
the inspection contract they were free to do so at any time. ,88 After cataloging
a number of things that SGS could have done, the defense argued, "All of
these services could have been arranged ... and all of these would have found
the barley. None of them would have been performed at the price or within
the parameters of the service that had previously been routinely requested by
and performed for plaintiff. 89 The argument failed, with the court holding the
performance inadequate. That left the question of damages.
Citing the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 351, comment f, and
Vitol, the trial court held that it would be unreasonable to hold SGS liable for
foreseeable damage. The informal nature of the dealings, including absence
of a detailed written contract, indicated that there had been no careful attempt
to allocate risks. Because of the extreme disparity between the loss and the
price charged - the contract was for $150 and the damages requested were
$2.4 million - the court inferred that the parties had not meant to allocate
this risk to SGS.9 °
What the court gave in the name of contract, it took away under tort. SGS,
said the court, was liable for negligent misrepresentation since it had made a
representation that someone had relied on. It should have recognized that if
it were to issue a certificate, the plaintiff would take no further precautions.
At the same time, the plaintiff was also negligent because it had not brought
home to SGS how important it was that the inspection be performed with
great care. Had it been so informed, SGS might have performed a more
careful inspection. Therefore, each was partly at fault. Holding them equally
responsible, the court held SGS liable for 50% of the damage.
On appeal,9 ' the only thing that survived was the outcome. Judge Winter,
agreeing with SGS that its only duty to Interore arose from contract, threw out
the tort claim. Despite the fact that Interore had not appealed the treatment of
its contract claim and that neither party had briefed the issue, Judge Winter held
that Vitol was merely dictum and that Interore could recover its consequential
damages.92 The Vitol reasoning "cannot be reconciled with the controlling
88 Defendant's Post Trial Brief at 4.
89 Id.
90 This was a bifurcated trial with damages to be determined later, so the $2.4 million
figure's relationship to "the damages" is looser than usual. In the damage phase of
the trial, the damage was reckoned at $480,000 plus prejudgment interest. Report
and Recommendation of the Magistrate, Mar. 31, 1993.
91 Int'l Ore & Fertilizer Corp. v. SGS Control Serv., Inc., 38 F.3d 1279 (2d Cir. N.Y.
1994). I worked briefly (and without compensation) for SGS prior to oral argument.
92 The trial court reduced the damages by 50% because of the plaintiff's contributory
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New York case Glanzer v. Shepard."93 This is a peculiar reading of Glanzer,
both because of the difference in the nature of damage in the two cases
and because in Moch, Cardozo himself had drawn an inference regarding
the defendant's assumption of liability from the magnitude of the fees.
Moreover, Cardozo's decision in Glanzer concerned only the existence of
liability, not the financial consequences of a defendant's failure.
Judge Winter distinguished, unconvincingly, the court's Sundance
decision.
Our recent decision in Sundance ... is not to the contrary. Sundance
was an action for damages on a contract for the classification for
insurance purposes of an ocean-going passenger vessel. The court
held that the disparity between the fee charged on the contract and
damages sought disclosed that the parties did not foresee the risk of
such liability. However, the purpose of the contractual obligation of the
ship classification society in Sundance contrasts markedly with that of
the inspector in Vitol and in the present case.... In Sundance, the court
therefore concluded that "the purpose of the classification certificate
is not to guarantee safety, but merely to permit [the ship owner] to
take advantage of the insurance rates available to a classed vessel."
The purpose of the inspection in this case, however, was precisely to
guarantee the condition of the hold so as to insure the preservation of
the cargo. There is no other reason to perform such an inspection and
no other reason to pay for one, whatever the amount. 94
That is a non sequitur. Regardless of the reason for undertaking the
contractual obligation, the question remains: What is the promisor's liability
if it fails to perform? Should it be liable for all the consequential damages,
and can we infer anything from the disparity between the fee and the
damage? The Sundance court concluded that the disparity between the
asserted damage and the fee suggested that the parties did not intend to
assign this risk to the provider of the service. The court might well have been
wrong - the argument has a certain circularity - but it is, nonetheless, the
argument on which the trial court in Interore relied.
Judge Winter seems to have distinguished the cases on the ground that
the classification of society's task is ancillary to the purchase of insurance.
negligence. Judge Winter would have given Interore all the consequential damages,
but held that its failure to appeal the contract claim precluded his increasing the
award.
93 38 F.3d at 1284.
94 Id. at 1285.
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But if Interore had wanted assurance, it did not have to purchase it from
the inspector. It could have purchased insurance from third parties, and the
availability of that insurance would have been contingent upon Interore's
obtaining various inspection certificates. In its defense, SGS noted the
commercial availability of insurance against the adverse consequences of
its failure to find the barley:
Plaintiff's suggestion that Control Services [SGS] should have
exercised a level of care commensurate with Interore's potential losses
... is flawed on two grounds. First, Control Services was not in this
instance an insurer. It is possible to purchase - for a premium -
insurance that will guarantee either or both of the quantity and quality
of goods on arrival. It is also possible - again for a premium - to
obtain so-called "full rejection coverage," insuring against rejection of
a cargo for any reason.95
Had Interore purchased either form of insurance, the insurer would have
almost certainly required inspection to cope with the inevitable moral
hazard and adverse selection problems. Had it purchased the insurance,
would Judge Winter have let SGS off the hook? Should liability depend
on whether Interore purchased insurance or self-insured? Holding the
surveyor liable for the losses arising from its negligence (or less-than-
workmanlike performance) converts it into an insurer. If disclaimers will
not be honored, then the surveyors are providing compulsory insurance with
neither deductibles nor copayments nor any of the other devices that insurers
use to limit their exposure.
There is nothing wrong, in principle, with a party having multiple sources
of recovery against the same risk. Subrogation is, after all, common, and
insurance rates will reflect the insurance company's expected net recovery
from others. Their Lordships danced around that issue in The Nicholas
H.96 Still, other things equal, if compulsory insurance for surveyors would
result in a system of costly transfers between insurers, that ought to make
surveyor liability a less attractive policy. So, holding surveyors liable for
consequential damage comes down to the effects of insurance that is both
mandatory and duplicative.
95 Defendant's Post-Trial Brief at 21.
96 See text accompanying supra notes 69-76.
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V. TIE EVIDENCE FROM PRACTICE
If measurement errors are random, traders should expect that in the long
run, the errors will balance out. Holding surveyors liable means that they
in effect provide a form of insurance that is triggered by a finding of fault.
If surveyors as a class are potentially liable for errors, their revenues must
be sufficient to cover the costs of providing this insurance - their potential
liability and the legal fees. With liability, then, the traders will pay a small
amount in each transaction to cover the expected damages and legal fees
and, on occasion, will receive compensation for a loss arising from the
mismeasurement. The question is whether the gains to traders as a group
from the incremental deterrence effect of legal liability exceed the net costs
(essentially the litigation costs).
A trader might be involved in hundreds of transactions in a given year,
purchasing surveying services from a small number of companies. The
surveyor has a substantial incentive to take care even if there is no legal
liability, since it must worry about its reputation and good will with the
particular trader and with the trade itself. So, even absent liability, the
surveyor has a powerful incentive to perform in a competent manner.
Moreover, any incentive arising from the liability exposure is blunted by the
surveyor's "errors and omissions" policies, which will cover at least some
of its exposure. Of course, if the E&O policy were experience-rated, then
the liability exposure would have more impact on the surveyor's behavior.
To further complicate the picture, the trader's direct insurance might well
cover this contingency as well, in which case its direct insurer would, via
subrogation, attempt to recover its payments from the surveyor's insurer.
Shifting the losses around in this way looks like a reasonably expensive
proposition with little to show for it in the way of deterrence. My instinct
is that the costs to traders as a class of holding surveyors liable exceed
the benefits. If the surveyors are small firms with shallow pockets and if
the amounts in dispute are likely to be small, it would not be surprising to
observe the parties accepting any default rule, including the Glanzer-rule.
In those instances in which surveyors are reasonably large entities with deep
pockets and potential liability is large, I would expect that the common
interest of the parties would best be served by limiting the liability of the
surveyors to a modest multiple of their fee. While the first point seems to
be confirmed in practice, the evidence on the latter is mixed.
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A. Beans
If Glanzer were relitigated today, the contract would not present a hurdle to
the buyer's recovery. Public weighers have not inserted liability limitations
in their contracts. This suggests a nice, easy conclusion: Cardozo had it
right. Weighers would pay compensation if they have erred, and buyers and
sellers would find it in their mutual interest to have the weighers provide
this limited insurance. In fact, the picture is more complicated than this.
True, the weighers have not revised their contracts. But this observation is
vitiated by two facts. First, their contracts are oral, not written. The absence
of disclaimers and similar clauses in an oral contract is hardly noteworthy.
Indeed, it could hardly be otherwise. Of course, if the issue mattered that
much, the parties could have found it in their mutual interest to reduce at least
one aspect of their relationship to writing. So, it is possible that they would
have preferred a regime in which weighers were not legally responsible for
errors, but the costs of putting it (and the rest of the agreement) in writing
exceeded the benefits. Second, no one seems to care. I spoke with some
industry veterans (one of whom had been a public weigher for forty years),
and no one could recall a public weigher being sued for negligent weighing.
The Glanzer-rule, right or wrong, did not seem to matter.
B. Coffee Beans
Many international coffee transactions are under standardized contracts
published by the Green Coffee Association. Buyers and sellers agree that
if a dispute arises, their only recourse will be to arbitration under the
Association's rules. The arbitration clause encompasses all controversies
"involving the principals, agents, brokers, or others who actually subscribe
hereto," the final term including public weighers. The arbitration and the
remedies are governed by New York law, except that consequential damages
cannot be awarded. That is somewhat ambiguous, since Glanzer is still
New York law and the damages could be deemed consequential. If the issue
were to arise, I suspect that the arbitrators would find that the limitation
on consequential damages applies only to the buyer and seller, so that the
Glanzer-rule would apply.
The beans are weighed both at the load port and discharge port. Since
these weights might differ, the contracts must specify a mechanism for
determining the transaction weight. The standardized contract provides for
two options - delivered weights and shipping weights. The former is
straightforward. The latter is qualified: "Coffee covered by this contract is
sold on shipping weights. Any loss in weight exceeding - percent at port
2002]
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of discharge is for the account of Seller at contract price.' '97 The blank term
can be negotiated and is typically one percent or less. So, if the weight on
arrival is within one percent of the invoice weight, the seller pays on the basis
of the shipping weight. If the invoice weight exceeds the destination weight
by more than one percent, the payment to seller will be adjusted downward.
98
Regardless of which option is chosen, the contracts require that the coffee
be weighed within fifteen days of delivery.99 The expenses of weighing are
assigned to one party, usually, but not always, the buyer. The weigher's lack
of privity with one of the parties, a feature of the Glanzer contract, continues
to this day.
My industry informants suggest that the contract language is not taken
seriously in arbitrations."° Regardless of who hired the weigher, the weigher
is viewed as an agent of both the seller and buyer. Further, errors discovered
outside the fifteen-day window will often be corrected despite the clear
language. A five-month gap, as in Glanzer, however, would almost certainly
be too long. The weigher would, under Glanzer, be liable to a disappointed
buyer. However, the buyer's first recourse would, in practice, be against
the seller. Only if the seller were to become judgment-proof in the brief
interval between the initial weighing and the correct weighing or if it were
no longer subject to reputational sanctions would it be necessary to pursue
a remedy against the weigher. Industry veterans could not recall an instance
of a weigher being asked to make up the quantity difference. If, however,
the buyer believes that it has been short-weighted, even after the fifteen days
have passed, it would expect the weigher to pay for the reweighing, despite
a lack of contract language to that effect.
For coffee traded on the Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa Exchange, the rules
are quite different. Weighers and other intermediaries (master samplers and
graders) are licensed by the Exchange. If the weigher fails to comply with
97 C&F Contract of the Green Coffee Assoc. of New York City, Inc., effective Feb.
1, 1989 (on file with author) [hereinafter C&F Contract].
98 Weighing errors at the port of origin are likely to be skewed in favor of sellers,
because of fears of corruption. If the beans weigh more at the destination than at
origin (probably because of a weighing error at the origin), the buyer gets a break.
99 "Coffee is to be weighed at the port of destination within fifteen calendar days after
discharge from the vessel ... . Weighing expenses, if any, for account of Buyer."
C&F Contract, supra note 97. The contract also requires that quality claims be
made within fifteen days.
100 Compare with Lisa Bernstein's findings that for the commodities she has examined,
the arbitrators take the contract language extremely seriously. Lisa Bernstein, The
Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary
Study, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710 (1999).
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the appropriate procedures, it is subject to fines and penalties. Nothing in
the Exchange rules suggests that the fines or penalties will be related to
the market value of the shortfall or that the buyer will have any recourse
against the weigher. The Exchange disclaims any liability to coffee traders
for errors:
The Exchange, its officers, committee members, or employees, whether
or not negligent, shall not be liable: (i) in any way by reason of the
fact that coffee delivered under Coffee "C" contracts was not sampled,
graded, weighed, or certified in accordance with the Rules; or (ii)
for the authenticity validity, or accuracy of documents or any other
information or data prepared by third parties (including samplers,
weighers, and warehouses) not in the employ of the Exchange,
notwithstanding the fact that the Exchange might select or license
such third parties to take certain actions in accordance with the Rules,
unless it is established that the Exchange, its officers, committee
members, or employees acted in bad faith in failing to take action or in
taking such action as was taken, and that such failure or action caused
any loss.' 0 '
So, the Exchange, the one deep-pocket intermediary in the coffee business,
contracted around the Glanzer-rule. It is not liable to the contracting parties,
barring some egregious behavior on its part. The weighers themselves are
subject to discipline for failure to follow proper procedures, not for erroneous
weighing; that discipline does not include making the buyer whole. That
outcome conforms to my expectations.
C. Petroleum Products
I would have expected that contracts for the international shipments of
petroleum products would limit the surveyor's liability. The surveyor is
hired by buyer and seller, so there is no privity issue. The traders typically
engage in a large number of transactions, and the number of surveyors
serving this market is small. The surveyors tend to be large firms with
reasonably deep pockets, and the potential damage is substantial. All of
these factors suggest that the liability issue is important enough to warrant
the attention of the parties. The fact that most, if not all, surveyors include
liability limitations in their terms and conditions - recall the discussion of
101 Coffee, Sugar & Cocoa Exchange, Coffee "C" Rules, Rule 8.10 (e) 4828 (1990).
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Saybolt's contract 0 2 - seems to confirm this. However, the truth appears to
be a bit more complex.
While it is true that the surveyors include the disclaimers on their price
lists, the oil traders are not entirely happy about it. Their ex post discontent
would not be noteworthy. We would expect that a firm that has suffered
a $500,000 loss as a result of a surveyor's error would be upset. There
appears to be ex ante resistance as well. Industry sources indicated that
one response the traders make when they receive the price lists is to send
back acknowledgment letters that state that the liability limitations are not
accepted. In the remainder of this Section, I will propose a number of
explanations for the traders' apparent opposition to liability limitations,
even if such limitations might be in their interests. Of course, even if the
oil traders willingly accepted the terms ex ante, the courts' hostility to
the disclaimers could trump even if the traders unambiguously gave their
consent.
One possible explanation might be a variant on the free-rider problem.
Suppose one oil trader accepts the disclaimer, while others do not. If the
surveyor cannot charge a higher price for its services for the clients who
refuse the disclaimer, then this trader will bear the costs of liability to
others, but not reap the benefits. This explanation has an obvious problem.
What prevents the surveyor from setting a higher price for the subset
of customers who insist upon maintaining their right to sue? A standard
response to this question is the invocation of adverse selection. Those
sellers of surveying services who would insist upon a disclaimer might be
systematically inferior to those who would not; or those oil traders who
would insist upon maintaining their right to a legal remedy might deal in
cargoes that have a greater likelihood for disputes or they might be vulnerable
to greater damage claims in the event of a surveying error. By haggling over
the disclaimer, the party reveals unfavorable information about itself. This
seems highly unlikely for the oil traders since their repeated dealings would
dampen any problems that could arise from such information asymmetries.
Could negotiation over a disclaimer reveal much new information about
either the surveyor or the oil trader, given a history of hundreds of similar
transactions? I am skeptical.
The free-rider explanation might be salvaged in another way. Lawyers
have learned how to game the battle of the forms.0 3 Rather than negotiating
the terms either one-on-one or collectively, they state their terms unilaterally
102 See text at supra notes 54-61.
103 See text at supra note 62.
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and hope that their terms will be the ones honored by the courts if the dispute
ends up in litigation. If the surveyors do not object to an acknowledgment
letter rejecting the liability limitation, perhaps because no one in authority
read the letter, then the trader gets the ex ante benefit of being treated like
everyone else and the ex post benefit of preserving the right to sue. The oil
traders are likely emboldened by the judicial hostility to liability limitations.
A second response is what Hanson and Logue" 4 label the first-party
insurance externality. If the surveyors have broad protection under an errors
and omissions policy, they might not reap much of a benefit from cutting
their exposure. The gains accrue to their insurer, which might not fine-tune
rates enough to make the no-liability policy sufficiently attractive. However,
the insurance typically is experience-rated so that it amounts to temporally
spreading the surveyor's liability costs; this externality, therefore, tends to
disappear.
A third explanation relies on the peculiar nature of the marine insurance
market, particularly the prominence of Lloyds in that market. If something
goes wrong with a shipment, in many cases, the costs will be borne by an
insurer and that insurer will have a right of subrogation against whoever
caused the shipment to go awry. Within Lloyds, the risks are borne by
individual syndicates that are at least as concerned with their own liability
as they are with the total costs to Lloyds. It is possible that the distributional
issue - where the losses ultimately fall - dominates the efficiency issue.
Lloyds, unlike the Coffee Exchange, cannot or will not prevent the additional
round of litigation. If this raises the costs of insuring through Lloyds, it
need not hurt Lloyds insurers competitively if their way of doing business
defines how competitors must do business as well. In effect, this argument
relies on path dependency: traders are willing to pay additional costs for
assigning legal fault in their dealings with surveyors, because their insurers
are willing to pay the additional costs for assigning fault and the historical
development of the insurance market was such that the behavior remains
shielded from potentially lower cost competition.
Of course, the simplest explanation is that my instincts are just wrong.
The benefits to oil traders of holding surveyors liable for their negligence
could, indeed, outweigh the costs. I would feel more comfortable with that
conclusion if the courts were to routinely honor liability limitations in B2B
transactions and the gamesmanship in the battle of the forms were properly
constrained.
104 Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The First-Party Insurance Externality: An
Economic Justification of Enterprise Liability, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 123 (1990).
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Glanzer and Ultramares taken together suggest a somewhat unusual tort
rule. Cardozo did not pay much attention to how the rule that comes out of
these two decisions interacts with contract. In effect, the rule is: if it is easy
to contract out, hold them liable; if it is difficult to contract out, do not. In the
case of the negligent accountant, the ease of contracting is not symmetrical.
It is hard for the accountant to contract specifically with the many people
who might come across his report. If a disclaimer against the world is not
enforceable, then he cannot protect himself from suits by plaintiffs who used
his faulty work without paying for the privilege. If the default rule were no
liability, then any potential user who wanted the accountant to provide some
form of insurance could purchase it directly from the accountant.
For Glanzer and other traders, contracting out was relatively easy; indeed,
oil traders usually were in privity. In some instances, reaching the potential
claimants before performance would not be so easy; for example, a hold
inspector in Florida might find it inconvenient to contract with a buyer in
New Zealand.105 The greater hurdles to a contractual solution were judicial
hostility to liability limitations and the traders' ability to game the battle of the
forms.
Because the barriers to contracting are generally low for surveyors, it
would seem the most sensible rule would be: no contract, no liability. If
contracting were easy, there would be no need for tort. If, however, tort law
were to define the default rule, then the barriers to contracting out should be
lowered, particularly the hostility to disclaimers.
105 It would not be terribly difficult to insist upon indemnification from the seller if
the seller were to fail to extract acceptance of a disclaimer from the buyer.
